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Discussant's Response to
A n Historical Perspective of Government Auditing
With Special Reference to the U.S. General
Accounting Office
Richard E. Brown
Kansas Legislative Post Auditor
Critiquing Professor Herbert's paper is an assignment of great interest to me
for a number of reasons. Some years ago while a doctoral student at Harvard
University, I was literally forced by a professor to write a seminar paper on the
U.S. General Accounting Office. Later I turned that paper into a doctoral dissertation, and ultimately into one of the world's smallest selling books. Shortly after
this I was a consultant to the G A O and, among other tasks, helped the G A O update Senate Document 11: Financial Management in the Federal Government.
A n d the relationship continues even now. The Kansas Legislative Division of
Post Audit, the Kansas Legislature's audit agency which I head, is in reality a
mini-GAO. Indeed the office was based on model legislation developed some years
ago by the G A O . Like the G A O , my office performs a variety of audit work, including both financial and performance auditing. The audit staff in Kansas, like
that in the G A O , is a multidisciplinary audit staff. I could continue this analogy in
many ways.
Summary of K e y Concepts In Paper
Professor Herbert makes it very clear that his paper is a record of his own impressions, a very personal account of government auditing and accounting,
especially with regard to the G A O . He takes us from early voucher auditing,
through balance sheet audits in the earlier days of the republic up to about 1920,
and finally, with the G A O ' s creation in 1921, to the larger concerns of the profession with audits of financial statements and auditing with concern for generally
accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing standards. Professor Herbert mentions the 1945 Government Corporation Control Act, which
made the G A O ' s audits of government corporations comparable to those of C P A
firms, and he also discusses the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act to a limited extent. This latter piece of legislation mandated that the G A O should be the public
accountant for all agencies and departments, and not only for government corporations. In effect, this Act extends the 1945 lessons in commercial-type audits
to all government entities, calling for on-site financial audits of all agencies.
The paper discusses several other developments which occurred in the mid1950s, and it is important in this connection to keep in mind that Professor
Herbert joined the staff of the G A O in 1956. According to Professor Herbert, of
6,000 employees at that time, only 1,226 could be classified as accountants and
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auditors. Of these, only 226 were "professionals." Moreover, "most of the
agencies and departments of government," in Professor Herbert's words, " d i d
not have an accounting system that would provide information that could in any
way be said to be in accordance with G A A P . ' ' Thus, the G A O was unable to extend its financial auditing to all governmental entities in keeping with the thrust of
the 1945 and 1950 legislation. A n d thus was born the term "comprehensive
audit," the early term used by the G A O for a partial financial review, coupled
with economy and efficiency audits of small parts of organizations. A s Professor
Herbert points out, Congress seemed pleased with the turn of events. Financial
statement audits, according to the author, were eventually eliminated except for
corporation audits.
In the 1960s there was still a further shift in the audit work of the
G A O . A congressional push toward effectiveness audit work developed.
Professor Herbert states: " B y the end of the 1960s, G A O had practically
divested itself of that punitive approach to auditing—reviews for legal compliance, for errors in individual vouchers, and for efficiency and economy
of individual actions . . . " The trend toward overall reviews for effectiveness, according to the author, automatically brought about more concern for the future than for what had happened in the past.
Finally, Professor Herbert makes a few predictions for the future. He
says that state and local governments will move to the same auditing mix
as the G A O , that is, less auditing of financial statements and more
auditing of program performance. He also feels that there will be a growing role for C P A firms in governmental auditing, including performance
audit work, and that C P A firms will take the lessons they learn in their
governmental practice to their audits of private sector firms, thereby expanding the scope of the traditional financial audits performed there. Professor Herbert also predicts fairly major and rapid changes in generally accepted accounting principles for government. Lastly, he concludes that
while he is optimistic about the future of the profession, he is also a little
fearful; fearful that if others "take over the newer fields of auditing, and
financial statement auditing becomes less and less important, then what
happens to the accounting and auditing profession?"
A Differing V i e w of Events
Reading Professor Herbert's account of the history of governmental
accounting and auditing in America, and the G A O ' s influence on it,
brings to mind the story of the three young boys watching a couple embracing on the sofa:
—The seven-year old says: "They're fighting.''
—The nine-year old says: "Don't be silly; they're making love.''
—The eleven-year old says: "Yes, and badly at that.''
In short, I view these same historical events quite differently. While I share
Professor Herbert's concern for the future role of the profession, I believe the
G A O has helped put us in this quandry. A s I view the situation, the G A O ,
throughout its history, has made several key decisions the wrong way, and has
failed to make some other decisions it should have made.
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T o begin with, the G A O had a very slow start in American financial management. The same 1921 Budget and Accounting A c t which created the then
Bureau of the Budget, also created the G A O . It is significant, however, that while
the Bureau of the Budget proceeded rather rapidly to become a strong financial
arm to the White House and to the Presidency, the same cannot be said of the
G A O and its relationships to the U.S. Congress. The detailed on-site voucher
checking and the associated attitude and atmosphere which permeated the early
G A O lasted well into the 1940s. The more modern and broader view of auditing
as a strong management and congressional tool of oversight did not take hold in
the G A O until much later. Indeed, Professor Frederick C. Mosher writes in The
GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American Government:
The beginning of the transformation of the General Accounting Office
coincided approximately with the conclusion of World War II . . . In
1947, for example, the G A O :
—Maintained 100,000 appropriation limitation accounts, 44,000 personal accounts with accountable officers, and about 270,000 other accounts;
—Countersigned 60,000 Treasury Department warrants and approved
14,000 requisitions for disbursing funds;
—Audited 93,000 accountable officers' accounts (containing 35 million
vouchers), 5 million transportation vouchers, 1.5 million contracts,
260 million postal money orders, 57 million postal notes, and 26
million postal certificates;
—Settled 108,000 accountable officers' accounts, 354,000 postmasters'
accounts, and 773,000 claims;
—Reconciled 490 million checks;
—Issued 1,300 reports on inspections, surveys, and special investigation,
made 6,200 replies to miscellaneous inquiries from members of Congress, issued 400 reports to the President, Congress and to the Bureau
of the Budget, and issued 7,400 decisions of the Comptroller General
and 2,200 reports to the attorney general.
1

Indeed, one could argue that it is only in the last decade or so that the G A O
has come into national prominence as a strong financial management tool of and
in American government.
Once having begun to become an effective force within government, there are
scattered signs that the G A O may have moved too far, too quickly, and perhaps
even in the wrong directions to gain recognition. A s indicated above, the 1945
Corporation Control Act, coupled with the 1950 Budget and Accounting Act,
were expected to extend commercial-type, financial statement audits to all entities
of government. In essence, this would have entailed an audit of the financial
statements of governmental entities, and in accordance with generally accepted
auditing standards, leading to an opinion that the statements were fairly presented
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. This development,
however, has not occurred. Professor Herbert's data suggests that a lack of
qualified staff, a lack of adequate accounting systems, and congressional disinterest
are the culprits. Out of this period came the "comprehensive audit.'' While I am
not entirely certain exactly what this audit is, it is certainly a very partial financial
audit.
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A glimpse of the division of audit effort today in the G A O is most revealing.
Professor Mosher presents the following data in his study.
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Percentages of G A O W o r k by Program Category
1972

1973

1974

1975

1976

1977

12

11

10

Financial
Economy &

14

13

14

Efficiency

56

53

54

52

49

41

Program
Results

30

34

32

36

40

49

Source: The GAO's monthly "Overview Report."

The bottom line is that ten percent of the G A O ' s audit effort in 1977 was
devoted to financial auditing while 90 percent was spent on performance auditing,
including efficiency and program results work. It is difficult to reconcile this situation with recent financial problems and crises in American government. It is also
puzzling, given recent actions by the Federal government, through its Federal
Revenue Sharing Act and through the Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-102, Attachment P, to in effect mandate that all state and local units of government receiving substantial amounts of federal funds receive audits conducted in
accordance with G A A S , of financial statements basically prepared on the basis of
G A A P . One can not help wonder why, if this is such a good idea for state and
local units of American government, the G A O has not found it necessary to work
toward this same end in the Federal government. Moreover, it is worth noting
that both of these efforts to bring about uniformity and accountability in American financial management have come through executive agencies, the Office of
Management and Budget and the Department of Treasury, and not through the
nation's audit agency, the G A O . A t this very moment, as a variety of prestigious
study groups are attempting to revise the concept of generally accepted accounting principles for American government, and while there seems to be a
determination to ensure that state and local units of government are brought into
compliance with such accounting and related audit requirements, there seems to
be an equal determination that the Federal government itself shall not be covered
by such requirements.
If there are difficulties with this end of the audit spectrum, the same could certainly be said of the other end of the audit spectrum—that relating to performance
auditing. The G A O ' s movement to program evaluation occurred swiftly in the
1960's and 1970's. Yet we find Professor Herbert writing:
I have always made a distinction between program auditors and program analysts or program evaluators. The auditor must be independent in
order to render an independent conclusion or opinion. The analyst does
not necessarily have to be independent or even unbiased. His way, in his
opinion, should be the only way to go, even if it is biased. Yet, without an
independent audit on the way he chose to go, whether the right way or the
wrong way, third parties would have no way of knowing whether he chose
the right or wrong way.
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Program evaluation does indeed seem to be different than performance
auditing in a few crucial ways. We can not pursue these differences in any depth
here, but their existence and their importance is raised in a volume by Sar A .
Levitan and Gregory Wurzburg, Evaluating Federal Social Programs: An Uncertain Art:
By insisting on preserving its independence and, in particular, failing
to adequately acknowledge other literature and incorporate it where appropriate, the G A O divisions that do the vast majority of the social program evaluations may be forcing their work into a strait jacket that
reduces the effectiveness of their work. G A O tends to ignore the
legislative and administrative agendas behind social legislation and oversimplify the reality in which social programs are implemented. The work
rarely questions the practicality of congressional mandates and pays too little attention to the inevitable difficulties inherent in the implementation of
social policies.
The insistence upon independence for financial auditing is, of course,
justified. But elsewhere, the limitations this puts on G A O reduce the
usefulness of its products. The benefit of independence in evaluating the
complexities and nuances of intricate social programs is ambiguous at
best. . .
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Much needs to be done to establish that performance auditing is still auditing,
and, due to its volatile nature, independence will become more and not less important. More significantly, according to Professor Herbert, the G A O ' s effectiveness
work necessitates a futuristic view. I do not agree with such an assessment, and
the implications are serious. The G A O is in danger of becoming a "think tank"
for the Congress—doing much work which is similar to that conducted by consulting houses, the Legislative Reference Service, and the Congressional Budget
Office—and not an audit organization at all. (One person's definition of a policy
analyst, incidentally, is a scholar who really wants to be governor or president but
does not want to bother running for office or hold that kind of responsibility.) Professor Mosher concludes in his book that the " G A O has stretched its meaning of
the word 'audits' beyond anything contemplated twenty years ago, and some of
its work—an increasing share—can hardly fit within that rubric, however it is
defined.'' One must question using the cloak of auditing, and the power and tradition normally associated with that term, to look not at past actions and performance of management, but instead to conducting future-oriented studies,
analyses, and evaluations. In the wrong hands this becomes a method to use the
power of auditing to second-guess elected representatives in a democratic system
and perhaps even to wield their authority for them. Ultimately, such an approach
may discredit government auditing of all kinds, whether financial or performance.
In any event, there would seem to be other organizations around capable of doing
such future-oriented analyses.
There is one final substantive comment that I would make on the content of
the paper by Professor Herbert. That relates to the almost total lack of discussion
of the vital role played by others in the evolution of government auditing over the
last several decades. Nearly all developments are attributed to the U.S. General
Accounting Office and the Federal government. Of course state officials grow accustomed to this, and officials from small states learn especially fast. Let me
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merely indicate that the American states are also involved in a leadership role in
this area, and are certainly up with the G A O in matters relating to progressive
auditing.
Item: performance auditing. Lennis Knighton's classic doctoral dissertation
and book in the mid-1960s on The Performance Post Audit In State Government, makes it clear that the performance audit movement was well under way in
the states at that time. Performance auditing is presently conducted in a number
of states and is quite good. This work is presently as well done as that of the G A O ,
is probably presented to decision makers on a more timely basis, and has a considerable amount of impact.
Item: financial auditing. Financial auditing is done more frequently at the state
level, practicing in effect what the "feds'' are preaching.
Item: organizational advancements. Pressures for a national state auditors
association, for the national system of intergovernmental audit forms, and for
quality review have resulted as much from the pressures by state audit groups as
from a leadership effort by the U.S. General Accounting Office.
Conclusions
In closing, let me return to Professor Herbert's predictions for the future. He
states that state and local governments will move toward the same mix of audit
work as the G A O . He must therefore mean that state and local entities will do less
financial auditing and more effectiveness—including futuristic—kinds of studies.
M y assessment would be that this development is unlikely, given the varied
federal laws and regulations which now exist and which in effect mandate a different kind of audit emphasis. Moreover, I personally do not believe state audit
agencies should follow the G A O lead any longer in this matter. While state
legislators are very interested in performance auditing and, indeed, are demanding
such audits more than ever, it appears they are interested in performance auditing
as an add-on to basic financial audit work, and not as a substitute for it. They seem
far more concerned over auditing and assessing past performance than in using
auditors to try to read the future.
Professor Herbert states that C P A firms will play a greater role in governmental auditing, including performance audit work, and that the lessons they learn in
government will be brought into the corporate audit work that they conduct. I
believe that this is probably a reasonable assessment of what is occurring in Kansas, as well as in a number of other states in America. This is so in large measure
due to the recent requirements placed on state audit organizations by the federal
government. It is unlikely that state audit staffs will be allowed to expand rapidly
enough to themselves conduct all the required financial audit work. It should be
noted, however, that C P A firms are unlikely to learn to conduct high-quality performance work in the near future. O n one recent occasion one of the Big 8 public
accounting firms was considering hiring me as a consultant to prepare a brochure
on performance auditing for the firm. The effort was finally aborted by a national
partner who feared that "someone might read the brochure and actually believe
that his firm could do performance audit work!''
A n d finally, Professor Herbert fears that if others "take over the newer fields
of auditing, and financial statement auditing becomes less and less important, then
what happens to the accounting and auditing profession?" I share Professor
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Herbert's concern in this regard. "Others"—the evaluators, the analysts—are
indeed trying to take over the new fields of auditing. This trend, however, is in
large measure due to a lack of forward-looking leadership by the G A O , the
American Accounting Association, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, and most others who have an important role and stake in this matter. Apparently they are too easily satisfied that these newer kinds of auditing are
simply not auditing at all, and so do not want to be involved. A n d thus, policy and
decision makers are looking outside the auditing profession for the conduct of
modern audit work, and these groups generally do not have the all-important
traditions and guidelines of auditing to see them through.
Our professional societies and related groups must begin to be more responsive and imaginative, and begin to bring such new techniques and developments
into the well-established audit fold. A related issue today is the fact that there is
less interest in financial auditing by decision makers at a time when this should
not and need not be the case. Again, however, in my view much of the blame for
this development must be directed to our professional leadership organizations, including the G A O . Through their attention—their research priorities and their
decisions—these groups have failed to persuade public officials that financial
auditing is important and, coupled with the newer forms of auditing, can indeed
provide a valuable service to them and to the taxpayers of this country.
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